The Democratic Party’s historic midterm victories may lead to major policy changes—but don’t expect them to come in the area of trade.
Some Democrats, along with the free market globalist faction of the Republican Party, have tried to blame the outcome not on the Iran War or Trump’s unpopularity but on tariffs, citing an NBC News exit poll in which 66% of respondents claimed that tariffs hurt rather than helped the economy. But this result is not consistent. An August Council on Foreign Relations poll, for example, found the public evenly divided on the trade issue, with only half of Americans viewing Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the European Union as “fair” trading partners and only one-quarter thinking that the president should remove tariffs on those countries.
What explains these inconsistencies? One factor is the low “salience” of trade. Because trade policy is not top of mind for most voters most of the time, policymakers of both parties risk little by departing from public opinion.
Two long-term trends, however, are clear. One is that Republicans are replacing Democrats as the more trade-skeptical party. The other trend is a bipartisan response to the rise of China as a rival superpower, and the threat that Chinese mercantilism poses to American military and industrial power.
A generation ago, major opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization came from traditionally Democratic factions: manufacturing trade unions, environmentalists demanding that trade treaties include climate protections, and anti-capitalist radicals like the “black bloc” anarchists who engaged in violent protests at WTO gatherings around the turn of the century. In 2015, this coalition of unions and leftists was strong enough to compel Hillary Clinton to switch from supporting to opposing President Barack Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership trade treaty.
Meanwhile, Gallup polls show that from 2000 until around 2010, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to agree that foreign trade provides “an opportunity for growth through increased exports.” Although Congress passed NAFTA’s authorizing legislation in 1993, the underlying agreement was negotiated and formally signed in 1992 by a Republican president, George H. W. Bush. While President Bill Clinton supported the deal, more congressional Republicans than Democrats backed NAFTA, with 34 Republicans and 27 Democrats voting for it in the Senate, and 132 Republicans and 102 Democrats supporting it in the House. The 1994 legislation approving the creation of the WTO passed with Republican and Democratic majorities in both the House and the Senate. In 2000, the Republican House majority backed Clinton in granting permanent normal trading relations to China, with almost three-fourths of Republicans favorable compared to just one-third of Democrats.
In the 1990s, a substantial minority of Republicans supported protectionist measures and were attracted to presidential candidates Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan. But the pro-trade majority in Congress under Clinton and George W. Bush reflected the views of most Republican voters of the time, not just Republican donors and Republican-aligned corporations seeking cheap labor or foreign government subsidies or new markets abroad. As late as 2009, registered Republican voters thought that free trade agreements had been good for the country by a 57-31 margin; in 2016 they thought, 63-32, that free trade agreements were a bad thing.
Today, free trade gets more support from Democrats. Remarkably, given the role of the radical Left in the anti-WTO protests of the 1990s and 2000s, Democrats with a favorable view of the Democratic Socialists of America today are more likely to “strongly support” free trade agreements with other countries (54%) than Democrats who are unfavorable to the DSA (37%) and Democrats as a whole (48%). According to one poll, fully 74% of Democrats favor free trade, while a slight majority of 51% of Republicans want to reduce trade and instead pursue national economic self-sufficiency.
According to an NBC News exit poll, of the 21% of midterm voters who said tariffs helped the U.S. economy, 96% voted Republican, while of the 66% of those who thought tariffs hurt the economy, 81% voted for Democrats. Negative partisanship is clearly a factor in opinions about trade. Following the second election of President Donald “Tariff Man” Trump, support for free trade among Democrats jumped from 20% among liberals to more than 40%. But the fact remains that the two parties as a whole have flipped their positions toward trade since the 1990s.
Back to Basics?
Some argue the two parties are reverting to their historic roots. From the Republican Party’s formation in the 1850s through the middle of the twentieth century, the GOP tended to favor protectionism, reflecting the interest of mostly Northern manufacturing businesses in reserving the American home market for their products.
Thanks to Republican domination of the federal government from the Civil War until the Great Depression, U.S. tariffs ranked among the highest in the world. Republican Congresses enacted the Morrill Tariff of 1861, the McKinley Tariff of 1890, the Emergency Tariff Act of 1921, and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is demonized by free market fundamentalists who falsely claim that it caused the Great Depression (which started earlier) and/or caused World War II (which in reality was caused by Nazi and Japanese imperialism) and/or worsened the Depression (even the economist Douglas Irwin, a critic of historic American protectionism, has argued that three-quarters of the drop in U.S. imports in the 1930s was caused by the Depression alone).
The young Whig Party member Abraham Lincoln, in his first campaign for the Illinois legislature in 1832, declared his fealty to Henry Clay’s “American System” of federally sponsored import substitution, industrialization, and infrastructure development. “My politics are short and sweet, like the old woman’s dance,” he said. “I am in favor of a national bank. I am in favor of the internal improvement system, and a high protective tariff.” As the first elected Republican president, Lincoln worked with the Republican-dominated Congress to enact a version of Clay’s nation-building agenda, complete with the Morrill Tariff of 1861, federal subsidies for the transcontinental railroad, and centralizing national banking reforms.
Lincoln’s Republican successors shared his commitment to economic nationalism in trade policy. “For centuries England has relied on protection, has carried it to extremes, and has obtained satisfactory results from it,” Lincoln disciple Ulysses S. Grant said. “There is no doubt that it is to this system that it owes its present strength. After two centuries, England has found it convenient to adopt free trade because it thinks that protection can no longer offer it anything. Very well then, gentlemen, my knowledge of our country leads me to believe that within 200 years, when America has gotten out of protection all that it can offer, it too will adopt free trade.”
At the turn of the twentieth century, when American industry had largely caught up with that of Britain, Republicans downplayed the infant-industry argument and emphasized the tariff’s role in protecting American workers from immiseration by competition with cheap foreign labor. “Free trade will bring widespread discontent,” Republican president William McKinley warned. “It will revolutionize values.” McKinley’s vice-president and successor, Theodore Roosevelt, agreed. “Thank God I am not a free-trader,” he once said. “In this country, pernicious indulgence in the doctrine of free trade seems inevitably to produce fatty degeneration of the moral fibre.”
After winning the 1924 election, President Calvin Coolidge asserted that “under the helpful influences of restrictive immigration and a protective tariff, employment is plentiful, the rate of pay is high, and wage earners are in a state of contentment seldom before seen.” Coolidge also said, “My observation of protectionism is that it has been successful in practice, however unsound it may appear to be in theory. That must mean the [free trade] theories have not taken account of all the facts.”
Meanwhile, from the Antebellum Era through the 1970s, the Democratic Party was more enthusiastic about free trade. For generations its electoral base consisted of small Midwestern and Southern farmers. American agriculture, joined later by oil and gas interests, was not threatened by foreign competition and often favored trade liberalization to open foreign markets for exports. Agrarian Democrats tended to view tariffs as taxes which forced them to buy the more expensive products of Northern manufacturers rather than goods imported from industrial Britain and elsewhere. Many Democratic populists and progressives also denounced the tariff as “the mother of trusts,” on the erroneous theory that industrial consolidation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was somehow due to protectionism rather than the true cause—economies of scale.
In his first inaugural address as president of the Confederate States of America, Jefferson Davis, who had earlier represented Mississippi in the U.S. House and Senate as a Democrat, declared that the cotton-exporting Southern Confederacy would complement, rather than compete with, Britain, the United States minus the South, and other industrial countries. “[As] an agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing country [cotton], our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit,” he said. “There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the Northeastern States of the American Union.”
The only two Democratic presidents between the Civil War and the New Deal, Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson, supported free trade and criticized tariffs. When the Democrats enjoyed a trifecta of presidency, House, and Senate under Woodrow Wilson from 1913 to 1919, they passed the Underwood Tariff, which lowered the average tariff rate from 40% to 27%. As secretary of state in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, Cordell Hull, a former Tennessee senator, supported the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which transferred the power to lower tariffs from Congress to the president and required a two-thirds majority of Congress to repeal a tariff reduction. Hull also promoted free trade by laying the groundwork for postwar institutions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the precursor of the WTO. Like his fellow Southern Democrats, Jefferson Davis and Woodrow Wilson, Hull identified the self-interested free trade orientation of the commodity-exporting South with the causes of world peace and international harmony.
The claim that today’s Republicans and Democrats are simply returning to their parties’ traditional orientations thus seems plausible, but does not work upon closer examination. For one, each party’s constituencies are quite different today. While they may favor free trade, the progressive, college-educated big-city professionals who form the base of today’s Democratic Party have nothing in common with the Southern and Midwestern farmers who opposed tariffs in the past. And the strongest support for protectionism in the Republican Party comes from the working class and small business owners of the South and Midwest, who made up the traditional base of the old Democratic Party. Trump may praise his Republican predecessor, William McKinley, but his electoral map looks like that of McKinley’s opponent, Democrat William Jennings Bryan.
Another factor is that the American manufacturing lobby’s political power has contracted along with American manufacturing overall. While some firms still favor protection, the once-powerful Northern business lobby that opposed imports is extinct. Many American manufacturing firms that were not wiped out by imports during globalization have adapted by offshoring production to other countries or substituting foreign for American suppliers.
Unions in the manufacturing sector have resisted globalization-induced deindustrialization since the 1970s. But manufacturing’s share of total U.S. employment has plummeted from around 22% in 1979 to around 9% in 2024. The shrinking number of manufacturing workers in the electorate has allowed Reaganites in the Republican Party and Clintonites in the Democratic Party to marginalize them and their concerns.
Donald Trump won the presidency twice in part by appealing to voters in industrial states who felt betrayed by Democrats who pushed free trade agreements. But the overall salience of trade remains low. In the United States, as in Western Europe, mass immigration is a far more important issue for right-wing populists than industrial policy. Among Trump supporters in the 2024 election, the most important issues were the economy in general (93%), immigration (82%), and violent crime. For populists on the Right, denouncing illegal immigrant criminals and the excesses of the woke Left is more effective than criticizing unfair Chinese industrial subsidies.
New manufacturing in the United States tends to be located in suburbs and exurbs, particularly in the anti-union states of the South. This might seem like good news for Trump-style economic nationalism because the new geographic base of American manufacturing overlaps with that of the Republican Party. But the fact that 12 states account for 95% of manufacturing growth is a potential handicap, especially given rural overrepresentation in the Senate. Every state has farms, but not every state has significant numbers of factories.
White working-class voters without a college education, a majority-Republican group, are over-represented in rural and exurban America. But according to the U.S. Census, in “completely rural counties,” workers in “educational services and health care and social assistance” greatly outnumber manufacturing and agricultural workers. Manufacturing-led local economic growth at best will have an indirect effect on most residents of rural counties. And the backlash against both wind farms and big data centers in rural areas shows that many of their residents, whatever their views of trade or industrial policy in the abstract, will oppose the construction of new industrial facilities in their neighborhoods.
While Republican areas are divided about trade, the big cities and college towns that form the Democratic Party’s geographic base depend for their very survival on globalism. Net migration to suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas means that many Democrat-dominated big cities will shrink unless constantly refilled by new waves of foreign immigrants. And because most immigrants prefer the Democratic Party, mass immigration also supplies the urban party machine with new voters, and Democratic nonprofit service providers with new clients.
Similarly, the bureaucrats and faculty of colleges and universities, another overwhelmingly Democratic interest group, increasingly depend on foreign students and tuition money as the domestic college-age population shrinks. Major hubs like New York and San Francisco specialize in global services like finance, tech, insurance, consulting, and media, and seek their customers worldwide. Many of the same firms depend on an unfree labor force of H-1B indentured servants, 70% of whom come from a single foreign country, India. Metropolitan professionals depend on imported consumer goods and on retinues of low-cost immigrant services to provide their food, clean their clothes and homes, and tend their children and elderly. Support for free trade and mass low-wage immigration is a matter of crude self-interest for affluent Democratic urban professionals and their political representatives, even if they pretend they support these policies for idealistic reasons.
It is far from clear, then, that the electoral map favors strategic trade and reshored manufacturing. Republicans are divided on trade, while all significant Democratic factions from neoliberals to socialists support free trade and mass immigration.
What Really Drives Trade Policy
The truth is that changes in bipartisan views of American trade policy often follow shifts in global power politics rather than electoral realignments at home. To correct Tip O’Neill’s famous observation—all politics is local, except for the politics of national security.
World War II’s destruction of America’s industrial rivals, and the strategic imperative of using access to our market as a reward for joining the American Cold War alliance, produced a bipartisan consensus in favor of trade liberalization (despite the protests of a dwindling band of protectionist “Old Guard” Republicans). Free trade orthodoxy solidified after the Cold War ended, thanks to the illusion that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union augured perpetual U.S. military and economic primacy.
To the extent that the bipartisan policy establishment has begun to rethink globalization and free trade, it has done so in response not to manufacturing workers or conservative populists, whose concerns have been ignored by elites for decades, but in response to the perceived threat of Chinese military, industrial, and commercial power. The offshoring of much American and European industry, rather than turning China into a liberal multiparty democracy committed to free trade, has turned the Asian colossus into the world’s leading manufacturing center, one ruled by a Leninist regime that seeks to curtail American geopolitical power.
China could potentially become more powerful than the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany at their respective peaks. In 2025, China accounted for 28% of global manufacturing output, while the American share fell to 17%. In 2000, only 33 nations traded more with China than with the United States, a number that has climbed to 151 countries in the ensuing years.
American policymakers have been shocked to learn of the Pentagon’s dependence on Chinese supply chains, as well as China’s stranglehold on essential medical supplies made evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. In March of this year, the Brookings Institution, a long-time cheerleader for the conventional wisdom about globalization, published a report warning that China could weaponize its medicine supply.
The fact that President Biden kept and built upon the first Trump administration’s anti-Chinese trade policies shows that bipartisan support for globalization has given way to a new consensus that Chinese mercantilism and industrial dominance is incompatible with the security and prosperity of the United States and its allies. “The People’s Republic of China continued to subsidize at a massive scale both traditional industrial sectors, like steel, as well as key industries of the future, like clean energy, digital infrastructure, and advanced biotechnologies,” Biden administration National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said in 2023. “America didn’t just lose manufacturing—we eroded our competitiveness in critical technologies that would define the future.”
Compare that to these remarks made by Secretary of State Marco Rubio in late January 2025. “It’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power,” Rubio said. “That was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia…”
Historians of the future will likely reach their own consensus—that the recent bipartisan rethinking of trade policy primarily owes to the rise of China as a perceived threat, not to what voters tell pollsters they think about trade. So long as Sino-American rivalry sits at the center of great-power politics, the emerging elite consensus in favor of linking U.S. national security with at least partially reshored industry is likely to shape U.S. policy, regardless of which party controls Washington.





It is a class difference more than a political party difference. The moneyed elites occupy the Democrat party and the old GOP establishment. That has flipped over the last few decades as the Republican party used to be the party of the business class elite. But regardless, that top 10% are protective of the benefits of globalized corporate primacy and Wall Street control... despite the ongoing devastation to the lower 80%. MAGA is the Democrat-jettisoned forgotten working class that Trump brought to the GOP over anger that that top 10% kept up the destruction.
Our $1.4 trillion per year (real) trade deficit is as unsustainable as is our $2 trillion annual budget deficit... and directly related.
Global trade is good when the products and services are unique.
But globalism, including mass immigration, is a complete and utter failure.
The post Bretton Woods global order was good and worked well for the first 40 years, but NAFTA and China in the WTO was a massive break from that plan and corrupted the entire purpose to simply satiate upper class corporate and Wall Street greed.
There is no version of capitalism that ever supported turning domestic jobs into a global commodity. Capitalism as design is primarily a social system where domestic labor is supposed to share in the returns of domestic capital if only by the domestic jobs it creates. Exporting working class economic opportunity to other countries while importing the poverty of other countries... simply for the cheaper labor... was NEVER a part of any definition of true capitalism. It was a corporatist myth that capitalism supported the pursuit of profit at any cost to the domestic workforce.
The conflicts with trade are about economic opportunity for the majority. Most people understand that tariffs are a necessary tool to turn things around. There are other methods, but our feckless corporate-donor-addicted politicians will never go there.
Sorry, but cheap Chinese and Mexican-made goods on Amazon and at Walmart are not the American Dream.
For a lot of years after my economics degree, I was a free trade supporter. What finally convinced me otherwise was the supply chain issue. Combine that with Just in Time and you get a perfect storm. Free trade is more efficient but autarchy is a lot safer. We can't be totally self-reliant but we need to identify a lot of key resources where we need to approach that, especially where the product has a long lead time to set up production. One of life's ironies is that when *Biden put a gazillion dollars into infrastructure and manufacturing subsidies all the projects had such a long lead time as to minimize the political effect. As a bonus, it will start to reverse the hollowing out of middle America. The great sucking sound is part of the reason for the birth dearth. The inability to support a family on one working class job has had a devastating impact on family formation.